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Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

Baron, David P. and Hirsch, Alexander V. (2012) Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy. Economic Theory, 49 (3). pp. 639-681. ISSN 0938-2259. doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4.

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This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the aggregate policy utility of the coalition members and the lobbies, but lobbying can also lead to the preservation of the status quo and lobby-induced gridlock. When the status quo does not persist, the policy outcome is largely determined by the selection of a coalition, since legislative bargaining under unanimity within the coalition leads to a coalition-efficient policy regardless of the identity of the proposer. An example is presented to identify the types of equilibria and provide a full characterization of an equilibrium.

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Additional Information:© 2011 Springer-Verlag. Received 20 September 2010; Accepted 03 May 2011; First Online 07 June 2011. We thank Eddie Dekel, Timothy Feddersen, John Patty, Nicola Persico, Alan Wiseman, participants at the 2009 Wallis Institute Annual Conference and the 2010 Princeton Conference in Dynamic Political Economy, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
Subject Keywords:Lobbying; Public policy; Proto-coalitions; Common agency; Gridlock
Issue or Number:3
Classification Code:JEL: D72; H11
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190502-143313442
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Official Citation:Baron, D.P. & Hirsch, A.V. Econ Theory (2012) 49: 639.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:95190
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:03 May 2019 14:47
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 17:10

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