A Caltech Library Service

The Lobbyist’s Dilemma: Gatekeeping and the Profit Motive

Hirsch, Alexander V. and Montagnes, B. Pablo (2015) The Lobbyist’s Dilemma: Gatekeeping and the Profit Motive. . (Unpublished)

[img] PDF - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We consider a model of lobbying in which an interest group can directly solicit a policy favor from a politician, or transmit her request through an external lobbyist on a fee-for-service basis. The lobbyist’s value derives from her ability to investigate and screen clients according to the political merits of their request. However, her ability to extract that value in the form of profits is also dependent on the equilibrium credibility of her messages to the politician. Inspired by recent empirical results, we use the model to examine the effect of connections between the lobbyist and the politician, their ideological alignment, and the informational environment on the profitability of lobbyists, the price of lobbying services, and the welfare politicians.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190506-152124696
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:95265
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:06 May 2019 22:26
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 21:11

Repository Staff Only: item control page