A Caltech Library Service

Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?

Aktas, Nihat and de Bodt, Eric and Roll, Richard (2007) Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist? Economic Journal, 117 (522). pp. 1096-1121. ISSN 0013-0133. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02068.x.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


Why do regulatory authorities scrutinise mergers and acquisitions? The authorities themselves claim to be combating monopoly power and protecting consumers. But the last two decades of empirical research has found little supporting evidence for such motives. An alternative is that M&A regulation is actually designed to protect privileged firms. We provide a test of protectionism by studying whether European regulatory intervention is more likely when European firms are harmed by increased competition. Our findings raise a suspicion of protectionist motivations by the European regulator during the 1990s. The results are robust to many statistical difficulties, including endogeneity between investor valuations and regulatory actions.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Additional Information:© The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2007. Published by Blackwell Publishing. Submitted: 15 February 2005; Accepted: Accepted: 8 March 2006. We are grateful to Jonathan Karpoff for suggesting the central intuition of this article, to John Talbott and Marianne Bertrand (the editor) for constructive comments, and to two anonymous referees for their numerous constructive suggestions. which greatly improved the article. We thank also participants at the University of Alicante finance seminar, the EFA Conference (Maastricht, 2004) and the Second Corporate Finance day (Ghent University).
Issue or Number:522
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190506-160356840
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Aktas, N. , Bodt, E. d. and Roll, R. (2007), Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist? The Economic Journal, 117: 1096-1121. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02068.x
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:95271
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:06 May 2019 23:24
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 17:11

Repository Staff Only: item control page