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Equitable Voting Rules

Bartholdi, Laurent and Hann-Caruthers, Wade and Josyula, Maya and Tamuz, Omer and Yariv, Leeat (2019) Equitable Voting Rules. In: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery , New York, NY, p. 315. ISBN 978-1-4503-6792-9.

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A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem (1952), providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.

Item Type:Book Section
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URLURL TypeDescription Paper ItemJournal Article
Tamuz, Omer0000-0002-0111-0418
Additional Information:© 2019 ACM. We thank Wolfgang Pesendorfer for useful comments. Tamuz gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Simons Foundation, through grant 419427. Yariv gratefully acknowledges financial support from the NSF, through grant SES-1629613.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Simons Foundation419427
Subject Keywords:social choice
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190625-114737785
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Official Citation:Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, and Leeat Yariv. 2019. Equitable Voting Rules. In ACM EC ’19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC ’19), June 24–28, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1 page.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:96700
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:25 Jun 2019 19:45
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 17:23

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