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The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

Barman, Siddharth and Echenique, Federico (2019) The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies. . (Unpublished)

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We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:Federico Echenique thanks the National Science Foundation for its support through grants SES-1558757 and CNS-1518941. Siddharth Barman gratefully acknowledges the support of a Ramanujan Fellowship (SERB - SB/S2/RJN-128/2015) and a Pratiksha Trust Young Investigator Award.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Science and Engineering Research Board (SERB)SB/S2/RJN-128/2015
Pratiksha TrustUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190626-090938938
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:96714
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:26 Jun 2019 16:15
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 21:24

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