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An Energy Sharing Game in Prosumers based on Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties

Chen, Yue and Mei, Shengwei and Zhou, Fengyu and Low, Steven H. and Wei, Wei and Liu, Feng (2019) An Energy Sharing Game in Prosumers based on Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties. . (Unpublished)

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The advent of energy "prosumers" that not only consume but also produce energy, advocates a sharing market to encourage energy exchange. Motivated by the recent technology of online platforms, this paper proposes a simple but effective mechanism for energy sharing by generalizing demand bidding. Towards this end, a generic supply-demand function (SDF) is devised for individual prosumers to determine their role of buyer or seller in the sharing market, where the outcome is shown to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) among prosumers. The existence and uniqueness of NE are proved. Properties of the equilibrium price are uncovered. Compared with individual decision-making, the disutility of each prosumer can always be reduced via purchasing cheaper energy in the sharing market, leading to a Pareto improvement. It is revealed that the total cost of prosumers decreases with the price elasticity and the sharing market equilibrium can achieve social optimum when the number of prosumers becomes large enough. It is also found that introducing competition benefits social welfare. Case studies confirm the theoretical results with analyses on the impacts of several key factors. This work is expected to provide insights on understanding and designing future energy sharing markets.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Mei, Shengwei0000-0002-2757-5977
Low, Steven H.0000-0001-6476-3048
Liu, Feng0000-0003-2279-2558
Subject Keywords:Prosumer, energy sharing, supply-demand function, game theory, Nash equilibrium
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190626-132932886
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:96742
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:26 Jun 2019 20:51
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 21:25

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