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Repeated Coordination with Private Learning

Basu, Pathikrit and Chatterjee, Kalyan and Hoshino, Tetsuya and Tamuz, Omer (2018) Repeated Coordination with Private Learning. . (Unpublished)

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We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Tamuz, Omer0000-0002-0111-0418
Additional Information:We thank Drew Fudenberg, George Mailath, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Roger Myerson, Philipp Strack, and Adam Wierman for comments. This work was supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation (#419427, Omer Tamuz).
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Simons Foundation419427
Subject Keywords:repeated games, coordination, learning
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190628-075628753
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:96805
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:28 Jun 2019 17:17
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 21:25

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