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Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences

Basu, Pathikrit and Dutta, Souvik and Shekhar, Suraj (2019) Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences. Economics Letters, 184 . Art. No. 108661. ISSN 0165-1765.

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We consider a society on the brink of ethnic conflict due to misinformation. An ‘informed agent’ is a player who has information which may prevent conflict. Can the informed agent achieve peace by communicating privately with the players? The issue is that if the informed agent is known to favour her own ethnicity, she is unable to communicate credibly with the other ethnicity. Despite this, we show that peace can be achieved in equilibrium. Our paper contributes to the literature on cheap talk games with multiple audiences with the novel addition of private signals along with payoff externalities.

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Additional Information:© 2019 Elsevier B.V. Received 28 May 2019, Revised 29 August 2019, Accepted 30 August 2019, Available online 4 September 2019. An early version of this paper was circulated under the title Ethnic Conflicts, Rumours and an Informed Agent. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. We are deeply grateful to Kalyan Chatterjee, Sona Golder, Edward Green, Kala Krishna, Joseph E. Harrington and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We also want to thank Anirban Mitra, Bruno Salcedo, Guillem Roig, Debraj Ray, Vijay Krishna, Co-Pierre Georg, participants at several presentations including the summer meeting of the Econometric Society at the University of Minnesota and seminar participants at The Pennsylvania State University for their comments.
Subject Keywords:Ethnic conflicts; Cheap talk; Multiple audiences; Private signals; Payoff externality
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20190906-092931288
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Official Citation:Pathikrit Basu, Souvik Dutta, Suraj Shekhar, Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences, Economics Letters, Volume 184, 2019, 108661, ISSN 0165-1765, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:98472
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:06 Sep 2019 17:25
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 21:41

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