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Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment

Brunner, Christoph and Camerer, Colin F. and Goeree, Jacob K. (2011) Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment. American Economic Review, 101 (2). pp. 1029-1040. ISSN 0002-8282. doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.1029.

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Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Correction and Re-Examination of "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 x 2 Games"
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Goeree, Jacob K.0000-0001-9876-3425
Additional Information:We would like to thank participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in Tucson (November 2008) for valuable feedback. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and the European Research Council (ERC Advanced grant, ESEI-249433).
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
European Research Council (ERC)ESEI-249433
Subject Keywords:stationary concepts, quantal response, action-sampling, payoff-sampling, impulse balance
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL: C70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-103637110
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:99362
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:18 Oct 2019 18:04
Last Modified:16 Nov 2021 17:46

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