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Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies

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Foundations of a Theory of Constituency Influence

Introduction

This chapter contains a presentation and discussion of the components of our theory. We will introduce and attempt to justify a number of concepts and assumptions which in combination make possible the analysis in later chapters. Like all theoretical worlds, the one we posit is more or less unrealistic, an idealization of the empirical reality we hope to explain. But if we abstract appropriately and capture the most important features of the empirical situation, then we may expect to find that the theoretical processes present in the model world bear some correspondence to the behavior we observe in the empirical world.

Parameters of the Voting Decision

Most fundamentally, we begin with the assumption that the representative is a purposive actor. His votes are not simply passive responses to role expectations, group memberships, and interest group pressures. Rather, the representative votes with an eye toward achieving valued consequences. As Mathews and Stimson argue,

... congressmen *attempt* to cast their votes so as to enhance the chances of achieving their goals. . . . The potential payoffs to congressmen for casting roll-call votes in a reasonably rational way are so great and the potential risks of following any other course so large, that the members *try*, and *try hard*, to be reasonable.¹

We do not believe that the assumption of goal-directed voting is particularly radical, although many investigators tend to view legislative voting more in deterministic than in purposive terms. The ultimate justification for the assumption, of course, is the explanatory power of theories based on it.

Given mass constituency unawareness of legislative issues and records, representatives apparently make their voting decisions in an atmosphere of great uncertainty about the political impact of those decisions. We assume that representatives deal with that uncertainty by making subjective judgments about the consequences of their votes and about other parameters of their decision situations. These subjective estimates then are processed as inputs into the voting

decision problem. Thus, the representative's perceptions become the link between his constituents and his vote. More exactly, Bayesian decision theory provides the model for our substantive theory.² Bayesian theory purports to prescribe optimal decision making under uncertainty. Possibly, then, it is relevant to the voting decisions of representatives. A conceptual interpretation of the formal representation of a decision problem constitutes the theoretical structure that we use in formulating a theory of constituency influence.

In Table 2-1 the θ_j symbolize mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive "states of nature," each of which has a probability, p_j ($0 \leq p_j \leq 1$, $\sum p_j = 1$) of occurrence. The a_i signify actions or strategies. An act, a_i , chosen when a state of nature, θ_j , holds results in a consequence, x_{ij} (which may be a set of specific outcomes). Decision theory addresses the question of the optimum choice of acts.^a

To render this abstract representation empirically useful one must provide substantive interpretations of each of the formal concepts. What *states of nature* does the representative have in mind when he makes his voting decision? What *actions* or *strategies* are available to him? What *consequences* are perceived given the available strategies and the relevant states of nature? What does one mean by an *optimal strategy*? Answers to each of these questions depend to a great degree on the answer to a final one: what are the representative's *goals*?

To begin to answer the preceding questions consider the representative's *goals*

Table 2-1
Formal Decision Problem

Acts	States of Nature		
	θ_1	θ_j	θ_n
a_1	x_{11}	x_{1j}	x_{1n}
.
a_i	x_{i1}	x_{ij}	x_{in}
.
a_m	x_{m1}	x_{mj}	x_{mn}

^aBayesian decision theory differs from other decision theories in its conception of probability. For Bayesians, probability is not an objective measure (e.g., relative frequency) nor a logical relation between propositions (e.g., necessary probability). Rather, probability is a personal "degree of belief," a subjective judgment about the likelihood of occurrence of an event. For an explication of the Bayesian viewpoint, one should consult Leonard Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics* (New York: Wiley, 1954). The classic articles on the topic of subjective probability are available now in Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Howard E. Smokler (eds.), *Studies in Subjective Probability* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

in a general way. Empirically goals are numerous. Reelection, legislative influence, prestige, policy, higher office, public service—all may play their part.³ But we would argue that reelection is the primary goal that the constituency controls: the district gives and the district can take away. Sometimes observers assume that representatives are not (or at least should not be) motivated by self-interest. Buchanan and Tullock comment wryly that we expect men to shift moral gears between the economic and political arenas.⁴ Realistically or cynically as the case may be, we believe that constituents' preferences are reflected in a representative's voting (if at all) primarily through his concern for his electoral survival. Assume that each representative evaluates his situation by a subjective estimate, p , of his current probability of reelection.^b That is, if the legislature were to adjourn today for the campaign, p would symbolize the representative's subjective probability of winning the election. We elaborate further on this estimate shortly.

It seems self-evident that the relevant *states of nature* involve the configuration of interested voters. Who cares, and on which side of the issue? The major difficulty with this suggestion is provided by the survey researchers' retort that "almost no one cares, ever." Thus, conceptualizing the states of nature poses the most difficult problem in formulating the theory.

We will assume, first, that the representative does not perceive his district as a collection of atomized voters who respond individually to his actions. Rather, we assume that the representative perceives his district as a collection of groups of voters with the members of each group holding like preferences. We use the term "group" as a kind of shorthand for the opinion sectors into which the representative divides the district; no false personification is implied. A group may be a well-defined formal entity such as COPE or the Possum Hollow Rod and Gun Club, a demographic segment of the constituency such as Catholics or blacks, or an "issue public" such as pro-prayer-in-schools. But in any case, the representative expects constituents to react to issues as members of a group; i.e., in their roles as union members or hunters or blacks rather than individual constituents.^c

Second, we assume that the states of nature for the representative's decision are based on the judgments of groups of constituents that the issue at hand is relevant or irrelevant to their interests. Thus, if a representative believes his district contains two groups, G_1 and G_2 , which might be interested in an issue,

^bOne should remember that probability of reelection is not equivalent to expected proportion of the vote, although the two should be related. It is perfectly possible for a representative who expects 55 percent of the vote to be more certain of reelection than one who expects 60 percent. The variance of the distribution of expected proportion of the vote is larger in the second case.

^cWe will be assuming that on each vote the contending groups are mutually exclusive. Such an assumption clearly would be ridiculous if applied to all votes, but we think it not unwarranted for single votes. On most votes alignments will be relatively nonoverlapping; e.g., business-labor, urban-rural, Republicans-Democrats, black-white, Catholic-Protestant.

then the states of nature are four: both G_1 and G_2 care about the issue; G_1 cares but not G_2 ; G_2 cares but not G_1 ; neither G_1 nor G_2 cares. Still, isn't the last state the case for all but the most well-organized groups? Is the problem of constituent apathy still with us, but at the group rather than the individual level? Our answer involves a special interpretation for the concept of "care."

Even though numerous informed constituents seldom pressure the representative directly, one suspects that the following question frequently crosses his mind: "What is the likelihood that this vote will provide a campaign issue that will activate the members of G_j ?"^d We take the answer to this question, c_j , as an estimate of the probability that G_j cares. Thus, we *conceptualize caring not as the actual state of concern of constituents at the time of the vote, but rather as their receptivity when the vote is brought to their attention during a future campaign.*^e Thus, the somewhat elusive probability that a group, G_j , cares about an issue, k , reflects the somewhat harder probability estimate, c_{jk} , that the representative's vote on issue k will provide a campaign issue which will move the members of G_j during the next election campaign. In effect, the probability that a group cares is not a current measurement. Rather, it is a judgment about a future state that exists after a representative and his opponent(s) have made their efforts to inform groups of the record.

Expressions of the preceding argument are not at all uncommon in the literature. For example, Clausen writes humorously but insightfully,

my image of the constituency is that of a somnolent giant usually oblivious to the representative's existence. However, this giant has certain tender spots that must be protected from the prodding opponent who would like to arouse the giant and turn its wrath on the negligent representative. To guard against this eventuality, the representative must constantly reexamine the otherwise placid constituency to locate the tender spots and provide the needed protection against the pesky opponent.⁵

And Gregory notes that

... it is ... arguable that it is a characteristic of the politician to see the chance of penalties and rewards where others see only public indifference and ignorance.⁶

Clearly, arguments like these rely on Carl Friedrich's "law of anticipated reactions."⁷ If this mechanism fails, then in all likelihood, so will our theory.

In sum, survey findings about voter apathy and ignorance do not invalidate our analysis. One should remember that reality is funneled through the

^dAs one of Clapp's interviewees commented, "When you measure pressure you measure it in terms of what the groups do in an election period" (my emphasis). Charles Clapp, *The Congressman: His Job as He Sees It* (Washington: Brookings, 1963), p. 187.

^eAgain, "You must be as smart in prospect as they [the voters] are in retrospect." Ibid., p. 178.

representative's perceptions, a point Dexter emphasized more than twenty years ago.⁸ *Less important than whether constituents actually care is whether the representative thinks they can be made to care.*

The actions open to a representative are to vote for or against a bill. Simultaneously the vote signals adoption of a position for and/or against groups of constituents who care about the issue, unless all are estimated to be totally indifferent. Thus, if a representative estimates that groups 1 and 2 favor a bill and groups 3 and 4 oppose it, we characterize his voting strategies as a_1 : vote with G_1 and G_2 ; and a_2 : vote against G_1 and G_2 . In Chapter 4 we admit a third strategy, abstention, and analyze its effects.

Let each representative measure the consequences of his actions in terms of increments, x , and decrements z , in his subjective probability, p , of reelection. That is, given that a group cares, the representative estimates that voting with the group results in some increase (at least no loss) in support from the group. Thus, his subjective probability of reelection rises from p to $(p + x)$, where $x \geq 0$. Conversely, if the representative votes against the group, he expects some loss (at least no gain) in support from the group. This reduced support is reflected in a lower probability of reelection $(p - z)$, where $z \geq 0$. Define the strength, S_{jk} , of a group, G_j , with respect to an issue, k , as $(x_{jk} + z_{jk})$. That is, a representative judges a group's strength on an issue according to their estimated total capability, $(x_{jk} + z_{jk})$, of changing his subjective probability of reelection. Henceforth, when we speak of stronger and weaker groups we use the term in this specific sense. Only groups for whom the representative estimates a nonzero strength need be considered in the decision calculus. Such groups we term *significant*. But notice that the representative determines significance, not the researcher.

In sociological terms the x_{jk} , z_{jk} are perceived positive and negative sanctions, respectively. Those who study sanctions have distinguished two components, a power or capability component, and an effectiveness or credibility component.⁹ To expand somewhat, a group has a certain sanctioning capability, if exercised, but also a certain likelihood of delivering. We have attempted to capture these components in the x_{jk} , z_{jk} , and c_{jk} , respectively. The x_{jk} and z_{jk} are to be interpreted as the aggregate payoffs if the group should react to a campaign issue stemming from the representative's vote. The c_{jk} represents the estimate that the vote does become an issue. We assume that the x_{jk} and z_{jk} estimates are independent of the c_{jk} estimate. That is, the representative is capable of separating the power or capability component from the likelihood component. Empirically, decision makers sometimes tend to confound their evaluations of payoffs with the probabilities of attaining them.¹⁰ Theoretically, though, we require greater exactitude from the political decision makers.

A final comment—our analysis takes the strength estimates as given. Clearly, these aggregate estimates must be functions of numerous arguments. The latter

would include a group's size, its control of resources such as money, media and workers, its properties as a reference group for other constituents, etc. Ideally, one would like a theory of how representatives combine such diverse elements into an overall strength estimate. That is a topic for future research. For the present we simply assume that representatives somehow manage to make such estimates.^f

All of the concepts introduced combine to make up the schematic voting-decision problem. Table 2-2 illustrates the interpreted decision problem for a very simple case: the representative's district is homogeneous with respect to the issue at hand (e.g., the 1957 Civil Rights Act in a Mississippi black belt district).

Several additional comments now are in order. First, we require that $x \leq (1 - p)$. If not, $(p + x)$, the representative's subjective probability of reelection after a vote "with" his constituents, may be greater than one. Similarly, $z \leq p$ insures that $(p - z)$ following an "against" vote will not be negative. Decision theorists have demonstrated that if decision makers are coherent, their subjective probability estimates will obey all the properties of the usual probability calculus.^g We impose such a consistency requirement on the model representatives. Second, if $c = 0$, the decision problem evaporates: both voting strategies yield equivalent results. For this reason, the analysis considers only nondegenerate decision problems—those for which $c_j > 0$ for at least one significant G_j . Thus, we do not attempt to predict every representative's vote on every issue. If a representative estimates that $c_j = 0, \forall j$, on a vote, that vote is outside the scope of the theory.

Table 2-2
Interpreted Decision Problem

Vote	Constituency (i.e., Whites)	
	Cares (c)	~ Care ($1 - c$)
With	x	0
Against	$-z$	0

where $x \leq (1 - p)$
 $z \leq p$

^fFor additional remarks on the conceptualization of the c_{jk}, x_{jk} , and z_{jk} , see Chapter 4.
^g"Coherence" is a technical term used by Bayesians. Essentially, if one's subjective judgments are coherent, it is impossible to formulate a series of bets such that one is sure to lose money. That possibility exists if one is incoherent. A necessary and sufficient condition for coherence is simply that the sum of the probabilities of n mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events is unity. See Bruno de Finetti, "Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources," in Kyburg and Smokler, pp. 93-158.

Motivational Assumptions

Although we have specified a representative's primary goal as reelection, as yet we have presented no precise criteria by which to identify an optimal strategy. In decision theory one assumes ordinarily that the decision maker is a maximizer. He always prefers more of a positively valued consequence to less of it, or less of a negatively valued consequence to more of it. If one were to assume that the representative's goal was to maximize his subjective probability of reelection, one would define an optimal strategy as one which maximizes his expected subjective probability increment. Referring to Table 2-2, a representative would choose to vote "with" on all decisions taking this form.

Maximizing assumptions have a long and honorable tradition. Of course, such assumptions are idealizations, but they appear to be sufficiently good approximations that useful theories can be based on them. Still, legislative researchers know that besides reelection, numerous other goals—legislative influence, policy, prestige, party loyalty, higher office—are quite important to many legislators. Can one ignore such goals? By no means, in our opinion. But, let us examine the question of goals more closely.

An important fact to remember is that there is no necessary incompatibility between a desire to maximize electoral support and a desire to achieve other ends. Many legislators may find that the various things they desire can be attained by the same behavior. For example, consider a John McCormack. Certainly, there is little reason to believe that maximizing support in his Irish working-class district would conflict with his New Deal Policy beliefs and his partisan leadership position. Those representatives whose goals are mutually reinforcing might as well maximize electoral support, for by doing so they simultaneously accomplish other ends. Thus, for representatives whose goals are congruent, to assume that they aspire to electoral certainty may be an oversimplification, but not a serious one.

Still, there are Frank Smiths in the world as well as John McCormacks.¹¹ That is, some representatives find their electoral goals not always consistent with other things they value—policies they favor, and legislative party loyalties in particular. Depending on the importance of these other goals relative to electoral support, the assumption of maximizing probability of reelection may be unacceptably inaccurate for such representatives. Were we willing to postulate utility functions defined over broadly specified packages of consequences, no problem would arise. A greater utility necessarily represents a more preferred set of outcomes than a lesser utility. But the introduction of utility functions invariably introduces severe difficulties in applying the theory. Rather than trade empirical applicability for theoretical generality, we have attempted to approach the matter of motivation another way. This alternative path utilizes ideas reminiscent of both lexicographic preference structures and man-as-satisficer.

As stated previously, let us assume that reelection is a representative's primary goal. One need not adopt a highly cynical view of politics to take such a position; rather one need only recognize that without achieving the office, the benefits of office are unattainable. Defeat means the loss of the opportunity to shape public policies, the loss of the opportunity to wield power, and the loss of future opportunities to help one's legislative party. Thus, reelection is naturally a representative's primary consideration; everything else naturally takes second place.^h But certainly there is no need to postulate that reelection is the *only* consideration.

Instead, following a well-known argument of Herbert Simon, let us assume that every representative establishes an aspiration level for his probability of reelection.^{1 2} This level signifies a "satisfactory" probability of retaining office. Until they attain their aspiration levels, representatives can be expected to follow maximizing strategies. Additionally, representatives who set extremely high aspiration levels may resemble maximizers. But some representatives may set their aspiration levels low enough that they bear a significant amount of electoral risk. Once a representative's probability of reelection equals or surpasses his aspiration level he may direct some attention elsewhere. He ceases maximizing efforts and shifts to a maintaining effort.

To translate the preceding heuristic argument into a precise formal statement requires more if's, and's, and but's than we would like. But we have little to go on. Numerous researchers have argued about satisficing behavior in an informal manner, but there is a paucity of attempts to formalize such arguments.^{1 3} Assume that first and foremost, representatives attempt to keep p within an interval, $[p^*, 1]$, $0 \leq p^* \leq 1$, where p^* denotes an aspiration level, a minimum acceptable subjective probability of reelection. So long as $p < p^*$, a representative attempts to maximize p : attainment of any goals other than an increased probability of reelection depends entirely on whether actions to attain them coincide with pursuit of the reelection goal. When $p^* \leq p \leq 1$, however, the representative ceases the maximizing effort and contents himself with doing no worse than breaking even in his voting. Define a *maintaining strategy* as one which assigns weights $(Q, 1 - Q)$, $0 \leq Q \leq 1$, to a_1 and a_2 in such a way as to result in no expected change in p . The set of *feasible strategies* for a maintainer, then is the continuum of two-tuples between $[Q, (1 - Q)]$ and $(1, 0)$, or $(0, 1)$ and $[Q, (1 - Q)]$, depending upon the decision. Any mixed strategy in this interval is acceptable in that it leads to no expected decline in p . The maintaining representative can choose whichever feasible strategy has associated

^hIn a lexicographic preference structure, a decision maker orders the dimensions of choice by their importance to him. He chooses the alternative whose expected outcome ranks highest on the first dimension, examining less important dimensions only in the event of ties on higher ones. The maintaining representative divides the dimensions of choice into two categories: probability of reelection, which is primary, and all others. He satisfices on the first dimension before looking to any other. This conceptualization is partially lexicographic, but certainly not completely so.

with it the most attractive package of secondary rewards. This latter strategy is his actual *optimal strategy*.

Clearly, then, a maintaining representative theoretically has more latitude in voting than a maximizing representative. The latter simply chooses the strategy with the highest expected reelection value. If all other goals conflict with this strategy, he foregoes them. The maintaining representative typically has a continuum of strategies from which to choose. He is restricted by a Q level which usually will be less than one. If all other goals conflict with the electoral goal, he still has a chance $(1 - Q)$ of attaining them. If all other goals are consonant with the electoral goal, he simply chooses the maximizing strategy. And, of course, everything in between is available to him. Notice that theoretical results about maximizing strategies translate into *exact* behavioral hypotheses. But theoretical results about maintaining strategies usually translate only into behavioral hypotheses which establish a *bound* on behavior. The maintaining strategy is not an exact prediction; it only sets a floor under a representative's voting; i.e., a representative must vote for a bill with probability *at least* Q . The assumption of maintaining behavior refers to the representative's desire at least to maintain a current position, not to a prediction that he votes so as to maintain p precisely unchanged. The latter prediction certainly would be wrong when other goals do not conflict with the electoral goal.

Two further points merit attention. First, because maintaining strategies typically are mixed, the optimal strategies eventually settled on by maintainers also may be mixed, particularly in cases of conflict among goals. While these mixed strategies yield no *expected* decline in p , on a single vote a representative might slip below his aspiration level. We will assume that such short-term stochastic falls in p below the level, p^* do not change the character of the representative from maintainer to maximizer. Over time, the laws of mathematical expectation will take care of the situation.

On the other hand, a more serious question may arise. Suppose a representative consistently chooses strategies which earn more constituency credit than the basic maintaining strategies. Eventually he then reaches a state where p is clearly higher than p^* . At such time the maintaining strategies calculated on the basis of no expected decline in p become too restrictive. For, seemingly the representative can afford to lose some probability of reelection. What does one predict about such a case? Here again we will follow Simon's discussion. Simon suggests that if decision makers find decisions "easy" in the sense that many alternatives produce outcomes all of which exceed the decision maker's aspiration level, a natural reaction of the decision maker is to up the level.^{1 4} In this manner the range of originally satisfactory alternatives narrows to a subset of superior ones. Particularly in view of the assumed partially lexicographic preference structure of the representative, we believe such an assumption is appropriate here. If a representative's voting causes p to rise significantly above p^* , this would indicate that there is more consonance in the representative's goals than the original

choice of p^* presumed. In effect, the original choice of p^* involves more electoral risk than the representative need bear. Thus, he can afford to raise p^* . We might expect p^* to "track" p , eventually reaching a kind of equilibrium level which denotes the greatest electoral security consistent with achieving conflicting secondary goals. Over time, optimal strategies converge to maintaining strategies as p^* varies.

Empirically, having the representative raise his aspiration level rather than drop his probability of reelection back to the old level appears reasonable to us. Opponents in the district may be encouraged by any sign that the representative's electoral position is deteriorating, regardless of his absolute position. Knowing this, a maintaining representative may not consciously strive to exceed his aspiration level, but once beyond it, he believes it imprudent to slip back.

To sum up the motivational discussion, the analysis to follow examines and compares the behavior of two types of representative. The first is the maximizer. A new representative might be working his way up to an initial aspiration level. A representative might have erred seriously on a vote, causing p to tumble far below p^* . A redistricting which removes old supporters or adds new opponents might affect p similarly. Those who desire subjective certainty ($p^* = 1$) can attain and maintain it only by behaving as maximizers, if then. And finally, those representatives who find a happy congruence among their goals can afford to maximize: their high aspiration level does not interfere with the attainment of secondary goals. For want of a better term we call the second type of representative the maintainer. He satisfies the condition $p^* \leq p \leq 1$. Having attained or exceeded his aspiration level he is content merely to avoid losing support. Any further gain is accidental. Thus, we have posited two ideal types of representative. Admittedly, both are approximations, as theoretical constructs always are. Hopefully two approximations will allow a more comprehensive analysis than one.

The Ungrateful Electorate

Only one task now remains before proceeding with the analysis. Optimal decision making involves a weighing of gains and losses. But thus far we have spoken of the costs and benefits to the hypothetical representative only in the most general terms. Indeed, all we have said is that a vote in accord with a group of constituents, G_j , merits an increment, x_j , while a vote against them incurs a decrement, z_j . We have specified no relationship between x_j and x_k , or z_j and z_k . Nor have we specified any relationship between x_j and z_j . The first set of relationships requires no special assumption. Without loss of generality, in each decision problem we will list the groups in order of their estimated strength. Thus, for a two-group decision, $(x_{1k} + z_{1k}) \geq (x_{2k} + z_{2k})$. In general, $S_{1k} \geq S_{2k} \geq \dots \geq S_{nk}$.

As for the relationship between x_{jk} and z_{jk} , we do impose an a priori restriction. Specifically, we assume that $z_{jk} \geq x_{jk}$, $\forall j, \forall k$. That is, given that a group cares about an issue, we assume that the representative believes that a vote in accord with the interest of the group gains him relatively less credit than a vote against their interest loses. This assumption expresses a rather common bit of political folklore. V.O. Key, Jr., once observed that perhaps voters vote "against," not "for."⁵ Political scientists all will remember Alben Barkley's classic, "What have you done for me lately?" anecdote.⁶ And in a splendid example of the sentiment we attempt to capture, a Tennessee voter observes

I think most people in Tennessee would like to vote Democratic because they make more money under the Democrats. But it's the people who're running as Democrats this time that make the difference. Voters aren't for Brock, they're against Gore. *And a man will stand in line at the polls a lot longer to vote against somebody than he will to vote for somebody.* (Our emphasis)⁷

Admittedly, the assumption that $z_{jk} \geq x_{jk}$, $\forall j, \forall k$ will violate reality on occasion. For example, if a representative believes $p = 0$ prior to a given vote, consistency requires that he estimate $z_j = 0$, $\forall j$ on that vote. Yet in this situation seemingly x_j could be positive for some G_j . Another example, if a representative estimates that 100 percent of a group oppose him, he might reasonably believe that they can't hurt him any more, but that they could help. But although the assumption may be empirically wrong at times, the violations probably occur in extreme situations like the above. Most of empirical reality lies between the extremes, so we trust the assumption will lead to no serious error, and it may capture an important aspect of the representative's environment.

While the ordering of groups from those with greatest perceived electoral strength to those with least, and the assumption that $z_j \geq x_j$, the theoretical structure now contains enough detail to permit the deduction of various behavioral propositions. A compact summary of the substantive concepts and assumptions introduced and discussed in this chapter precedes the analysis.

Summary

Let p	= the representative's subjective estimate of his current probability of reelection.
p^*	= the representative's minimum "acceptable" subjective probability of reelection.
G_j	= a significant group whom a representative estimates to be potentially concerned about an issue.
c_{jk}	= the representative's subjective estimate that his vote on issue k will draw G_j into the next election campaign.
x_{jk}	= the expected increment in p resulting from voting as the members of G_j prefer on issue k .

- z_{jk} = the expected decrement in p resulting from not voting as the members of G_j prefer on issue k .
- S_{jk} = the "strength" of G_j on issue k : $S_{jk} = (x_{jk} + z_{jk})$.
- a_1 = a vote with a set of groups who take a position on an issue.
- a_2 = a vote against the set of groups who prefer a_1 —by implication, a vote with a set of groups who hold an opposing preference.
- Maximizer = a representative who votes with the sole intention of maximizing p .
- Maintainer = a representative content to "break even" on each vote.
- $[Q, (1 - Q)]$ = a maintaining strategy.

Assumptions About Parameters of the Voting Decision

1. The states of nature are all the possible combinations in which n groups may "care" or not care;
2. The probabilities of the states of nature are calculated by combining the estimated c_{jk} 's, where the latter are assumed to be independently distributed;
3. The payoffs are the estimated x_{jk} 's and z_{jk} 's, where these are assumed to be independent of the c_{jk} 's.
4. $z_{jk} \geq x_{jk}$, \forall_j, \forall_k , where these numbers are constrained so as to satisfy the usual probability assumptions.

Motivational Assumption

A representative votes so as to raise his subjective probability of reelection, p , to a level, p^* , ($0 \leq p^* \leq 1$).

1. Until p reaches the level p^* a representative votes so as to maximize p .
2. If p comes to exceed p^* , a representative raises p^* .

One final remark: we have constructed an almost completely subjective model. Thus, the p , G_j , c_j , and S_j need not correspond to the judgments or measurements of outside observers. We believe that the explanation for a representative's voting behavior lies in his perceptions, not in ours. We may console ourselves with the supposition that those representatives who grossly misjudge the empirical situation probably do not survive long in the electoral arena.¹ But while they do, their judgments, however distorted, explain their voting.

¹Some evidence for this supposition appears in an article on Iowa legislators' perceptions of their constituents' opinions. The legislators were asked to judge whether each of four proposed constitutional amendments would receive majority backing in their districts in an upcoming referendum. Of those representatives with two or more incorrect predictions, 11

Notes

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2. For a good introduction to Bayesian decision theory see Howard Raiffa, *Decision Analysis* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968); Robert Schlaifer, *Analysis of Decisions Under Uncertainty* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).
3. For a discussion of Congressional goals, see Richard Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), Chapter 1.
4. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 210.
5. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide*.
6. Roy Gregory, "Local Elections and the Rule of Anticipated Reactions," *Political Studies*, 57 (1969), p. 32. For similar arguments, see Roger Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 121. John Kingdon makes several of the same points in an argument on p. 154 of *Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies* (New York: Random House, 1966).
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8. Lewis A. Dexter, "The Representative and his District," *Human Organization*, 16 (1947), 2-13.
9. See, for instance, Jerry B. Michel and Ronald C. Dillehay, "Reference Behavior Theory and the Elected Representative," *Western Political Quarterly*, 22 (1969), p. 771.
10. For evidence supporting both sides of the question, see F.W. Irwin, "Stated Expectations as Functions of Probability and Desirability of Outcomes," *Journal of Personality*, 21 (1953), 329-335. R. Duncan Luce and E.F. Shipley, "Preference Probability Between Gambles as a Step Function of Event Probability," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 63 (1962), 42-49.
11. Frank Smith, *Congressman from Mississippi* (New York: Pantheon, 1964).
12. Herbert Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957), Chapter 14.
13. Two papers which contain an informal discussion of satisficing vs. maximizing behavior among representatives are Donald Cell, "Maximizing, of 59 were defeated. Of those with one or zero incorrect predictions, 11 of 122 were defeated. Those who badly misperceived constituency opinion had twice as high a rate of defeat as their more accurate colleagues. See Ronald Hedlund and H. Paul Friesema, "Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion," *Journal of Politics*, 34 (1972), p. 745. See also, David Segal and Thomas Smith, "Congressional Responsibility and the Organization of Constituency Attitudes," in Dan Nimmo and Charles Bonjean (eds.), *Political Attitudes and Public Opinion* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 562-568.

Satisficing, and Discretionary Power,” Public Choice Society Paper, Blacksburg, Va., 1971. David Koehler and Robert Oshel, “Electoral Margins and Legislative Voting Power: A Test of the Relationship between Electoral Strategies and Legislative Effectiveness,” Public Choice Society Paper, College Park, Md., 1973.

14. Simon, p. 253.

15. V.O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 60.

16. Alben Barkley, *That Reminds Me* (New York: Doubleday, 1954).

17. Richard Harris, “Annals of Politics: How the People Feel,” *New Yorker*, July 10, 1971, p. 48.