Plott, Charles R. and Cason, Timothy N. and Gillen, Benjamin J. and Lee, Hsing-Yang and Maron, Travis (2022) General Equilibrium Methodology Applied to the Design, Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Large, Multi-Market and Multi-Unit Policy Constrained Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 1447. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-170008373
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Abstract
The paper reports on the methodology, design and outcome of a large auction with multiple, interdependent markets constructed from principles of general equilibrium as opposed to game theoretic auction theory. It distributed 18,788 entitlements to operate electronic gaming machines in 176 interconnected markets to 363 potential buyers representing gaming establishments subject to multiple policy constraints on the allocation. The multi-round auction, conducted in one day, produced over $600M in revenue. All policy constraints were satisfied. Revealed dynamics of interim allocations and new statistical tests provide evidence of multiple market convergence hypothesized by classical theories of general equilibrium. Results support the use of computer supported, “tâtonnement–like” market adjustments as a reliable empirical processes and not as purely theoretical constructs.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | The financial support for analyzing the data and developing this report provided to Plott by the Rising Tide Foundation (Grant Number: RTF-19-500) and the John Templeton Foundation (Grant Number: 58067) are gratefully acknowledged as is the technical support of the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economic and Political Science. Limited data analysis for scientific purposes was allowed by the Victorian government. The cooperation and help of William Stevenson of Intelligent Market Systems LLC were fundamental. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
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| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1447 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-170008373 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-170008373 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 99381 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Katherine Johnson | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 19 Oct 2019 00:03 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 27 Jul 2022 15:57 |
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