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Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2018) Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory. Social Science Working Paper, 1444. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove that there always exists a stable allocation of votes that is reachable in a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, any separable preference profile, and any restrictions on the coalitions that may form. If at every step all blocking trades are chosen with positive probability, convergence to a stable allocation occurs in finite time with probability one. If coalitions are unrestricted, the outcome of vote trading must be Pareto optimal, but unless there are three voters or two issues, it need not correspond to the Condorcet winner. If trading is farsighted, a non-empty set of stable vote allocations reachable from a starting vote allocation need not exist, and if it does exist it need not include the Condorcet winner, even in the case of two issues.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished version (Econometrica, 87 (2). pp. 631-652) ItemEarlier related research, "Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm"
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:We thank Yimeng Li, Kirill Pogorelskiy, and Enrico Zanardo for research assistance, and participants at several research conferences and seminars for their comments. We especially thank Scott Ashworth, Micael Castanheira, Reyer Gerlagh, Michel LeBreton, Cesar Martinelli, Debraj Ray, Richard Van Weelden, Rajiv Vohra, and Alistair Wilson for detailed comments and suggestions. The National Science Foundation (SES-1426560; SES-0617934) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (SES-1158) provided financial support. Part of the research was conducted while Casella was a Straus Fellow at NYU Law School and Palfrey was a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation. The hospitality and financial support of both institutions are gratefully acknowledged. The present manuscript expands on an earlier working paper version entitled Trading Votes for Votes: A Decentralized Matching Algorithm.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationSES-1158
New York University (NYU)UNSPECIFIED
Russell Sage FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Voting, Vote Trading, Condorcet Winner, Stability
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1444
Classification Code:JEL: C62, C72, D70, D72, P16
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20191022-145133373
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:99395
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:22 Oct 2019 21:58
Last Modified:19 Nov 2020 18:26

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