Published December 1998 | Version public
Journal Article

Repeated Implementation

Abstract

In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

Additional Information

© 1998 by Academic Press. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Received December 18, 1997; revised June 15, 1998. The authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Formerly SSWP 1027.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
83009
DOI
10.1006/jeth.1997.2459
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759

Funding

NSF
SBR-955421
New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA

Dates

Created
2017-11-07
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-15
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