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Published September 15, 2017 | Submitted
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On Bayesian Implementable Allocations


This paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. We show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information, neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences. We also identify conditions under which the Rational Expectations Equilibrium correspondence is implementable. We extend the concepts of fair allocations and Lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information, and show that envy-free allocations and Lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not.

Additional Information

We are thankful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under Grants IST-8406296, SES-8420486, and SES-8608118 and to the referees of this journal for helpful comments. We also wish to acknowledge several very helpful conversations with Andrew Postlewaite; in particular, example 4 derives October 1986 from a slightly different example he and David Schmeidler proposed. Published as Palfrey, Thomas R., and Sanjay Srivastava. "On Bayesian implementable allocations." The Review of Economic Studies 54.2 (1987): 193-208.

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