Published July 1983
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
The Geometry of Voting
Creators
Abstract
For any non collegial voting game, σ, there exists a stability dimension v*(σ), which can be readily computed. If the policy space has dimension no greater than v*(σ) then no local σ-cycles may exist, and under reasonable conditions, a σ-core must exist. It is shown here, that there exists an open set of profiles, V, in the c1 topology on smooth profiles on a manifold W of dimension at least v*(σ)+1, such that for each profile in v, there exist local σ-cycles and no σ-core.
Additional Information
Thanks are due to Jeff Strnad, at the University of Southern California Law Center, for making available some of his unpublished work. The result presented here as Theorem 1 is much influenced by Strnad's work.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp485.pdf
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sswp485.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81720
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-162353748
Dates
- Created
-
2017-09-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 485