Published July 1980
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A Class of Differential Games Where the Closed-Loop and Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Coincide
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Abstract
It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate in the sense that it depends on time (t) only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.
Additional Information
Published as Reinganum, Jennifer F. "A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide." Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 36.2 (1982): 253-262.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp333.pdf
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Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 82258
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171010-133022165
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-170436020 (URL)
Dates
- Created
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2017-10-10Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 333