Published January 11, 2005
| Version Accepted Version
Working Paper
Open
United We Vote
Creators
Abstract
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are the different optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within the coalition.
Additional Information
This work has benefited from valuable comments and suggestions by Matthew Jackson and by Paul Healy, Jonathan Katz, Jana Kunicova, Laurent Mathevet, Thomas Palfrey and Choi Kwok Pui. Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged.Attached Files
Accepted Version - sswp1208.pdf
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sswp1208.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 95032
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20190426-134751305
Funding
- NSF
- SES-0316493
- Caltech Lee Center for Advanced Networking
Dates
- Created
-
2019-04-26Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1208