Published October 16, 2017
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Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments with and without the Pareto Principle
- Creators
-
Border, Kim C.
Abstract
Social welfare functions for private goods economies with classical preferences are considered. It is shown that every social welfare function satisfying a weak nonimposition condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is of one of the following forms. It is either null or the class of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter or the class of anti-decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter.
Additional Information
Revised. I would like to thank Professor Ket Richter for many profitable discussions during earlier stages of this research. Published as Border, Kim C. "Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle." Journal of Economic Theory 29.2 (1983): 205-216.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp304_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82336
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-170534239
- Created
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2017-10-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 304