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Published September 8, 2017 | Submitted
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Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja


This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the provision of effort and financial constraints. The model is compatible with a large variety of contracts as observed in the region of El Ouija in Tunisia. Using an original set of data including financial data, various tests of the theory are realized. The role of financial constraints in the explanation of which type of contract is selected (as well as its implications that financial constraints affect effort and therefore output) are strongly supported by the data.

Additional Information

Published as Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Mohamed Salah Matoussi. "Moral hazard, financial constraints and sharecropping in El Oulja." The Review of Economic Studies 62, no. 3 (1995): 381-399.

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August 19, 2023
August 19, 2023