A Framework for Studying Emotions across Species
Since the 19th century, there has been disagreement over the fundamental question of whether "emotions" are cause or consequence of their associated behaviors. This question of causation is most directly addressable in genetically tractable model organisms, including invertebrates such as Drosophila. Yet there is ongoing debate about whether such species even have "emotions," as emotions are typically defined with reference to human behavior and neuroanatomy. Here, we argue that emotional behaviors are a class of behaviors that express internal emotion states. These emotion states exhibit certain general functional and adaptive properties that apply across any specific human emotions like fear or anger, as well as across phylogeny. These general properties, which can be thought of as "emotion primitives," can be modeled and studied in evolutionarily distant model organisms, allowing functional dissection of their mechanistic bases and tests of their causal relationships to behavior. More generally, our approach not only aims at better integration of such studies in model organisms with studies of emotion in humans, but also suggests a revision of how emotion should be operationalized within psychology and psychiatry.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. Under an Elsevier user license. Available online 27 March 2014. R.A. was supported by a Conte Center grant from NIMH (P50MH094258). D.J.A. is an Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. This work was supported, in part, by an Allen Distinguished Investigator award. We thank Richard Axel, Cori Bargman, Christopher Hitchcock, and Frederick Eberhardt for helpful comments.
Accepted Version - nihms578606.pdf