Published August 1982
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority
Creators
Abstract
This paper takes an initial stab at the delegation question. What incentives lead legislators to delegate not only the administration but even the formulation of public policy to unelected officials? A variety of considerations are relevant, but my focus will be on political (rather than managerial) incentives to delegate. The next section of the paper develops a simple framework in which the later discussion can be conducted.
Additional Information
Originally prepared for the Conference on Social Science and Regulatory Policy, Reston, Virginia—January 22-23, 1982. I am grateful to Roger Noll and Peter Aranson for useful comments on an earlier version.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp438.pdf
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sswp438.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81967
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-145410029
Dates
- Created
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2017-10-04Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 438