Published May 1978
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Pairwise Symmetry Conditions for Voting Equilibria
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Abstract
Necessary conditions are established for a point contained in the interior or boundary of a convex feasible subset of Euclidean space to be quasi-undominated in an anonymous simple game. Most of the conditions are behaviorally intuitive and imply pariwise symmetries among utility gradients.
Additional Information
This paper supplants its initial draft, which was circulated to a limited extent as "The Possibility of Voting Equilibria." Published as Matthews, Steven A. "Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria." International Journal of Game Theory 9.3 (1980): 141-156.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp209.pdf
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- Eprint ID
- 82558
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-161257825
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- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-153826230 (URL)
Dates
- Created
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2017-10-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 209