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Published July 17, 2008 | public
Journal Article

English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem


We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Additional Information

© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Received 6 February 2007; final version received 26 December 2007; accepted 8 July 2008.Available online 17 July 2008. The results in this paper were circulated earlier as two separate papers: "Minimal Assumptions for Efficiency in Asymmetric English auctions," by Dubra, and "Comparative Statics, English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem," by Echenique and Manelli. We thank Rabah Amir, Sergei Izmalkov, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Peter Neary, John Quah, Kevin Reffett, and Chris Shannon for useful comments. Manelli's research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-0095524 and SES-0241373.

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