Published December 1992
| Version public
Journal Article
Seniority in Legislatures
Creators
Abstract
We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.
Additional Information
© 1992 American Political Science Association. This paper was funded in part by National Science Foundation Grants SES-864348 and SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology and SES-9023056 to the University of Iowa. This paper was written in part while Raymond Riezman was a visiting professor at the California Institute of Technology. We thank Ken Shepsle and Jeff Banks for useful comments on earlier drafts.Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 53692
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20150114-101742922
Related works
Funding
- NSF
- SES-864348
- NSF
- SES-9022932
- NSF
- SES-9023056
Dates
- Created
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2015-01-14Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field