Published September 2002 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods

Abstract

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.

Additional Information

We are grateful to Alejandro Neme and Ruth Martínez for their helpful comments. Published as Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2004) Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (2). pp. 358-376.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp1140.pdf

Files

sswp1140.pdf

Files (256.6 kB)

Name Size Download all
md5:34c8d9459d744d9f9da3be9edebf348e
256.6 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
79789
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-154832632

Dates

Created
2017-08-02
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2019-11-26
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
1140