Published March 1992
| Version Submitted
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Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking
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Abstract
Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government.
Additional Information
I would like to thank Henry Chappell, Kenneth Coleman, Thomas Hammond, Roderick Kiewiet, Laura Langbein, Michael Munger, Joseph Rees, Donald Searing, and Stephen Weatherford for their comments on a previous version. Published as Keech, William R. "Rules, discretion, and accountability in macroeconomic policymaking." Governance 5, no. 3 (1992): 259-278.Attached Files
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- Eprint ID
- 80938
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-161329587
Related works
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- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-104904803 (URL)
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2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 789