Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published September 8, 2017 | Submitted
Report Open

Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism


This paper analyzes the provision of discrete public goods when individuals have altruistic preferences which others do not precisely know. The problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game. In contrast to standard social psychological approaches, based on such natural language terms as greed, fear, and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous mathematical treatment of social participation. This theory is shown to make strong testable predictions that can integrate data collected across a wide variety of natural and experimental settings. The al truism model is shown to be supported by existing experimental data on binary voluntary contribution games.

Additional Information

Published as Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 35 (3). pp. 309-332.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp659.pdf


Files (568.1 kB)
Name Size Download all
568.1 kB Preview Download

Additional details

August 19, 2023
January 14, 2024