Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published February 2012 | Submitted + Published
Journal Article Open

Contracts versus Salaries in Matching


Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms.

Additional Information

© 2012 American Economic Association. I thank Vince Crawford, Flip Klijn, Scott Kominers, and Michael Ostrovsky for very useful comments. I am also very grateful to three anonymous referees for their thoughtful questions and suggestions.

Attached Files

Published - sswp1322_-_published.pdf

Submitted - Contracts_vs._Salaries_in_Matching-Preprint.pdf


Files (1.0 MB)
Name Size Download all
154.0 kB Preview Download
860.4 kB Preview Download

Additional details

August 19, 2023
October 20, 2023