Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published June 1988 | public
Journal Article

Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes


Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Additional Information

© 1988 American Political Science Association. We would like to thank seminar participants at California Institute of Technology, the University of Rochester, and conferees at the International Conference on Coalition Theory and Public Choice, Fiesole, Italy, 1987 for comments and suggestions. Financial support of the National Science Foundation through grant SES-8700468 is gratefully acknowledged.

Additional details

August 19, 2023
October 20, 2023