Consistent representative democracy
- Creators
-
Chambers, Christopher P.
Abstract
We study axioms which define "representative democracy" in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules "partial priority rules." A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can "veto" certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.
Additional Information
I would like to thank John Duggan, Larry Epstein, Biung-Ghi Ju, Roger Lagunoff, Leonardo Martinez, Josef Perktold, Francesco Squintani, William Thomson, and Chun-Hsien Yeh for useful conversations. All errors are my own.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1217.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80003
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-093454389
- Created
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2017-08-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1217