Approximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Bipartite Subgraphs via an Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem
- Creators
- Barman, Siddharth
Abstract
We present algorithmic applications of an approximate version of Caratheodory's theorem. The theorem states that given a set of vectors X in R^d, for every vector in the convex hull of X there exists an ε-close (under the p-norm distance, for 2 ≤ p < ∞) vector that can be expressed as a convex combination of at most b vectors of X, where the bound b depends on ε and the norm p and is independent of the dimension d. This theorem can be derived by instantiating Maurey's lemma, early references to which can be found in the work of Pisier (1981) and Carl (1985). However, in this paper we present a self-contained proof of this result. Using this theorem we establish that in a bimatrix game with n x n payoff matrices A, B, if the number of non-zero entries in any column of A+B is at most s then an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game can be computed in time n^O(log s/ε^2}). This, in particular, gives us a polynomial-time approximation scheme for Nash equilibrium in games with fixed column sparsity s. Moreover, for arbitrary bimatrix games---since s can be at most n---the running time of our algorithm matches the best-known upper bound, which was obtained by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta (2003). The approximate Carathéodory's theorem also leads to an additive approximation algorithm for the densest k-bipartite subgraph problem. Given a graph with n vertices and maximum degree d, the developed algorithm determines a k x k bipartite subgraph with density within ε (in the additive sense) of the optimal density in time n^O(log d/ε^2).
Additional Information
© 2015 ACM. The author thanks Federico Echenique, Katrina Ligett, Assaf Naor, Aviad Rubinstein, Anthony Man-Cho So, and Joel Tropp for helpful discussions and references. This research was supported by NSF grants CNS-0846025 and CCF-1101470, along with a Linde/SISL postdoctoral fellowship.
Attached Files
Submitted - 1406.2296v3.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 58893
- DOI
- 10.1145/2746539.2746566
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20150715-122540136
- arXiv
- arXiv:1406.2296
- CNS-0846025
- NSF
- CCF-1101470
- NSF
- Linde Institute of Economic and Management Science
- Caltech Social Science Experimental Laboratory
- Created
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2015-07-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field