Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published January 2006 | public
Journal Article

Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model


This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate the properties of social preferences generated by simple games; we extend results on generic emptiness of the core; we prove the general nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated sets; and we prove the upper hemicontinuity of these correspondences when the voters' preferences are such that the core is nonempty and externally stable. Finally, we give conditions under which the undominated set is lower hemicontinuous.

Additional Information

© 2004 Elsevier Inc. Received 14 May 2003; final version received 6 August 2004. Available online 21 November 2004. Jeff Banks passed away on December 21, 2000. J.D. and M.L.B. wish to express their respect and admiration for Jeff as a colleague and dear friend. We will miss him. We are grateful for discussions with Kim Border, Mark Fey, Cesar Martinelli, Nicholas Miller, and Norman Schofield. We also thank a referee for helpful comments. Support from the National Science Foundation, Grant SES-0213738, is gratefully acknowledged.

Additional details

August 22, 2023
October 18, 2023