Published December 1984
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
A Note on the International Coffee Agreement
Creators
Abstract
This research note develops a model of the institutional features of the international coffee agreement and analyzes the allocation of export quotas under the terms of the agreement in 1982. It suggests that the agreement can be viewed as a weighted majority voting game. It employs the assumption of rationality to predict how allocations should be made given the rules of the agreement and tests the model by determining whether the allocations which passed (failed) fell within (outside) of the solution of the game.
Additional Information
The research for this note was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES 8216870); the Division of Humanities and Social Science, California Institute of Technology; and the Weingart Foundation. The note has benefited from comments by Philip Hoffman, Roderick Kiewiet, Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth Shepsle, Barry Weingast, Robert Keohane, Bela Balassa, Nathaniel Leff, Barry Ames, Cynthia McClintock, Michael Wallerstein, and Michael Westlake. Neither the sponsors nor the readers are responsible for the errors which it contains.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp554.pdf
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sswp554.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81540
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-143601562
Funding
- NSF
- SES-8216870
- Caltech Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
- Weingart Foundation
Dates
- Created
-
2017-09-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 554