Published April 1986
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Credibility and Law Enforcement
Creators
Abstract
The precommitment approach to law enforcement is inappropriate as a positive theory of crime and punishment because it is inconsistent with the institutional structure of U.S. law enforcement. We develop a formal model which integrates theories of optimal sanctions, individual criminal behavior and the allocation of effort to apprehension, and imposes credibility constraints on the choice of sanction—i.e., given the severity of a crime and the individual characteristics of the criminal, the sanction imposed must be optimal from society's perspective, after the crime has been committed.
Additional Information
We would like to thank Michael Graetz. Alvin Klevorick, and Sam Peltzman for helpful comments and discussions. Reinganum gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Center for the Study of the Economy and the State and the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business. Both authors acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation grant no. SES-8315422.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp604.pdf
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sswp604.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 83837
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171212-144640123
Funding
- NSF
- SES-8315422
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Center for the Study of the Economy and the State
- University of Chicago Graduate School of Business
Dates
- Created
-
2017-12-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 604