Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published December 1985 | public
Journal Article

Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

Banks, J. S.


Necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternative to be a sophisticated voting outcome under an amendment procedure are derived. The uncovered set, as first defined by Miller (1980), is shown to be potentially reducible, and conditions are determined for which this reduction equals the set of sophisticated voting outcomes. In addition, simple methods are given for calculating both the uncovered set and its reduction.

Additional Information

© 1985 Springer. Received May 15, 1984. Accepted September 10, 1984. Presented at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Phoenix AZ, March 1984. I would like to thank Gerald Kramer, Nicholas Miller, Norman Schofield, two anonymous referees, and especially Richard McKelvey for helpful suggestions and comments.

Additional details

August 19, 2023
October 18, 2023