Published April 1994
| Version Published
Working Paper
Open
In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote
Creators
Abstract
We present a positive theory of centralization of political decisions. Voters choose centralization or decentralization depending on their forecast of the political organization that will favor the policies they prefer. We study the induced preferences for centralization as well results of different forms of referenda.
Additional Information
Published as Crémer, Jacques, and Thomas R. Palfrey. "In or out?: Centralization by majority vote." European Economic Review 40, no. 1 (1996): 43-60.Attached Files
Published - sswp879.pdf
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sswp879.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 80717
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-164842884
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-141704583 (URL)
Dates
- Created
-
2017-08-28Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-22Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 879