Published July 1982 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

The Rationality of Candidates who Challenge Incumbents in Congressional Elections

Abstract

Making use of the numerous resources available to them, incumbent congressmen have come to enjoy very high rates of success in getting reelected. Typically, however, incumbents are challenged by relatively weak, unknown candidates, while potentially much stronger candidates are deterred. So why do these weak candidates engage in such apparently foolish behavior? Previous research has suggested several answers to this question. It is commonly argued that weak, inexperienced candidates either misperceive the odds against them, or that they are actually using a congressional campaign to pursue nonpolitical goals or political goals other than winning office. Others point out that weak candidates may be induced to run by a low probability of victory because their political opportunity costs are low or because a stronger than expected showing may serve as an investment in future campaigns. This paper argues, however, that there is a much simpler and direct reason why weak candidates choose to run against incumbents, and that is that they do so so as to maximize their probability of being elected to Congress.

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Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
81969
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-151046141

Dates

Created
2017-10-04
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2019-10-03
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
436