Published November 1992
| Version Accepted Version
Working Paper
Open
Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without Resoluteness
Creators
Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only of resolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are resolute. We prove a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case. It opens harder questions than it answers about the prediction of behavior and outcomes and the design of institutions.
Additional Information
We thank Peter Ordeshook, Thomas Palfrey, Charles Plott, and Martin van Hees for helpful discussions. Schwartz thanks the UCLA Senate for research support.Attached Files
Accepted Version - sswp817.pdf
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sswp817.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 80867
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-150133697
Funding
- UCLA
Dates
- Created
-
2017-08-28Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 817