Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published August 28, 2017 | Submitted
Report Open

A Note on Sequential Auctions


This note provides an explanation for the 'declining-price anomaly' in sequential second price auctions. We illustrate how the average winning bids of risk neutral agents bidding for objects with valuations drawn from independent, identical distributions are lower in later auctions than in earlier auctions. When the objects are not identical we determine the optimal order in which they should be auctioned.

Additional Information

We are grateful to Anne Sholtz, Ruqu Wang and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Both authors acknowledge financial support from SSHRC. We are responsible for any errors that remain. Published as Bernhardt, Dan, and David Scoones. "A note on sequential auctions." The American economic review 84, no. 3 (1994): 653-657.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp829.pdf


Files (181.0 kB)
Name Size Download all
181.0 kB Preview Download

Additional details

August 20, 2023
October 17, 2023