Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published June 1985 | public
Journal Article

Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources


A one-dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested. Candidates do not know voter utility functions, and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions. A fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined, using poll and endorsement data as information sources. It is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters, any equilibrium extracts all available information: all participants—voters and candidates alike—act as if they were fully informed. For fixed candidate strategies, a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium, and this process is shown to imply a "bandwagon effect."

Additional Information

© 1985 Academic Press, Inc. Received 31 January 1983, Revised 14 September 1984/ We acknowledge support of NSF Grant SES82-08184. We thank Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder for discussions which stimulated this research, and Gary Cox and John Ledyard for helpful comments. Formerly SSWP 434.

Additional details

August 19, 2023
October 17, 2023