Published November 3, 2016 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism

Abstract

In 1990 the South Coast Air Quality Management District created a tradable emissions program to more efficiently manage the ex- tremely bad emissions in the Los Angeles basin. The program created 136 different assets that an environmental engineer could use to cover emissions in place of installing expensive abatement equipment. Standard markets could not deal with this complexity and little trading occurred. A new combinatorial market was created in response and operated successfully for many years. That market design, called ACE (approximate competitive equilibrium), is described in detail and its successful performance in practice is analyzed.

Additional Information

To appear in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Cambridge University Press. John Ledyard would like to thank NSF for its support under grants numbered 1216024-ICES: Large: Collaborative Research: Markets - Algorithms, Applications and the Digital Economy and 1518941-NeTS: Large: Networked Markets: Theory and Applications.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp1424.pdf

Files

sswp1424.pdf

Files (653.7 kB)

Name Size Download all
md5:1adc680bfba160092b9189c35607da1b
653.7 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
78852
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443

Funding

NSF
CCF-1216024
NSF
CNS-1518941

Dates

Created
2017-07-13
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2019-10-03
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
1424