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Published June 1, 2006 | public
Journal Article Open

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets


We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Additional Information

Copyright © 2006 Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 2.5. Available at http://econtheory.org. Detailed comments from the coeditor, Martin Osborne, and two anonymous referees, helped us greatly improve the exposition in our paper. We thank Chris Chambers, John Duggan, Jeff Ely, Drew Fudenberg, Hideo Konishi, Utku Ünver and Matthew Rabin for comments and discussions. We also thank seminar audiences at the University of Arizona, Brown, Caltech, Harvard-MIT, Johns Hopkins, Penn, Princeton, U.C. San Diego, U.T. Austin, University of Wisconsin, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República. Part of this paper was written during a visit to the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, in Uruguay. Submitted 2005-9-1. Final version accepted 2005-12-16. Available online 2005-12-16.


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