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Published February 2003 | Accepted Version
Journal Article Open

Strong comparative statics of equilibria


Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and are valid for games of strategic complementarities.

Additional Information

© 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. Received 26 October 2000. Available online 18 February 2003. We are deeply grateful to Ilya Segal and Chris Shannon for their detailed suggestions and to Laura Gascue for her help with programming. This work was completed in February 2000 while we were both graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley.

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