Published April 2006
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
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What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Refutability of Matching Theory
Creators
Abstract
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind the refutability of matching theory. A preference profile rationalizes a collection of matchings if the matchings are stable under the profile. Matching theory is refutable if there are observations of matchings that cannot be rationalized. I show that the theory is refutable, and provide a characterization of the matchings that can be rationalized.
Additional Information
I thank David Ahn, Chris Chambers, Alekos Kechris, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sonmez and seminar audiences at UC Berkeley, Boston College, and audiences at the Wallis/Thomson Conference and the Caltech SISL retreat.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1252.pdf
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sswp1252.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 79681
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-105611460
Dates
- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1252