Published November 1989 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A Strategic Analysis

Abstract

In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit expert opinions to support their positions, and for the tax agency to distinguish among individuals who do and do not solicit expert opinions for the purposes of auditing. We also consider the implications of an ex ante constraint on the tax agency which requires it to treat all taxpayers who take the deduction alike in terms of audit rates, whether or not they solicit an expert opinion. Finally, we examine the effects of regulations which limit the degree of riskiness for which a supporting opinion can be justified as well as the effects of changes in various penalty rates.

Additional Information

Revised version. Original dated to July 1988. Professor Graetz thanks the National Science Foundation for research support (grant no. SES-870443) as do Professors Reinganum and Wilde (grant nos. SES-8903157 and SES-8902545).

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Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
81106
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-153557344

Funding

NSF
SES-870443
NSF
SES-8903157
NSF
SES-8902545

Dates

Created
2017-09-05
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2019-10-03
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
710