Published April 1990
| Version Submitted
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Bidding Rings
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Abstract
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.
Additional Information
Revised version. Original dated to December 1989 Published as McAfee, R. Preston, and John McMillan. "Bidding rings." The American Economic Review (1992): 579-599.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp726.pdf
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sswp726.pdf
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Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81086
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-140002664
Related works
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- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-163526509 (URL)
Dates
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2017-09-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 726