Initial Versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority

We compare two different seniority systems in a legislature whose sole task is to decide on distributive issues, and which operates under a Baron-Ferejohn recognition rule, where recognition probability is based on seniority. In the first system, called "initial proposal power", recognition probability for the initial proposal is based on seniority, but once the proposal is voted on by the legislature, all members have equal recognition probabilities for any reconsideration. Under the second system, called "continuing proposal power,'' seniority is used to determine proposal power both in the initial consideration and in any reconsideration. We find that in the case of seniority systems embodying continuing proposal power, there does not exist an equilibrium in which incumbents are reelected, and in which legislators would endogenously choose to impose such a seniority system on themselves. This contrasts with previous results in which we have shown that there does exist such an equilibrium for the case of initial proposal power. The reason for this result is that continuing proposal power lowers the value of senior members, since it makes them less desirable as coalition partners.