Published December 10, 2015
| Submitted
Book Section - Chapter
Open
Commitment in First-Price Auctions
- Creators
- Xu, Yunjian
-
Ligett, Katrina
- Other:
- Hoefer, Martin
Abstract
We study a variation of the single-item sealed-bid first-price auction where one bidder (the leader) is given the option to publicly pre-commit to a distribution from which her bid will be drawn.
Additional Information
© 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This research was supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0910940 and CNS-1254169, the Charles Lee Powell Foundation, and a Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship.Attached Files
Submitted - commitment.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 63371
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_23
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160105-095011433
- CCF-0910940
- NSF
- CNS-1254169
- NSF
- Charles Lee Powell Foundation
- Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship
- Created
-
2016-01-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 9347