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Published August 11, 2022 | Submitted
Journal Article Open

The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies


We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably retraded) by coalitions of small size, and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.

Additional Information

© 2022, INFORMS. Received: August 16, 2020. Accepted: January 22, 2022. Published Online: April 22, 2022. This work was supported by National Science Foundation [Grants CNS-1518941 and SES-1558757] and S. Barman gratefully acknowledges the support from the Science and Engineering Research Board [Grant SB/S2/RJN-128/2015].

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August 22, 2023
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