Equilibria with Unrestricted Entry in Multi Member District Plurality (SNTV) Elections
The hypothesis that the Duverger's Law can be extended to plurality multi member district elections received some empirical support in Steven Reed's (1990) study of the Japanese elections. Here we return to electoral data of Japan and Taiwan in order to find evidence consistent with the theoretical result offered in Part I of this essay, namely, that cohesive electorates should witness either the competition among as many "serious" candidates as there are seats, or, at most, one "extra" candidate. per race. We also compare the consistency of the data with two alternative sets of predictions, one—derived from our candidate-based model (strategic candidates; sincere voters), another—proposed by Gary Cox (1993) where strategic voter behavior is analyzed. The indications are that the strategic role of the candidates should be viewed as leading.
I would like to thank Peter Ordeshook, Rod Kiewiet and Elizabeth Gerber for their help and suggestions. I have also benefited from discussions with John Campbell, Matthew Shugart, and Skip Lupia. I also wish to thank Gary Cox and Emerson Niou for access to their data. Remaining errors are my own.
Submitted - sswp881.pdf